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Abstract 
High-frequency trading has significant influence on today’s capital markets and has received massive 
attention in the media. This research aims to provide a conceptual understanding of high-frequency 
capital markets by analysing information and value flows between relevant high-frequency trading 
market participants. In a first step, market participants including traders, brokers, market platforms, 
technology providers, information providers, and clearing agencies are introduced. Second, the trad-
ing process is described focusing on the three most important phases, namely the information phase, 
order routing phase, and order matching phase. Furthermore, we review widely adopted high-
frequency trading strategies such as market making, arbitrage trading, and pinging. Expert interviews 
are used to provide practical insights on the perception of high-frequency trading and the necessity 
for improved regulation. We merge theoretical knowledge and our findings from practice to develop 
the HFT Value Information Framework visualizing information and value flows between market par-
ticipants. We discuss the interrelations between market participants in current high-frequency capital 
markets and describe implications for different stakeholders. Finally, the implications for regulatory 
bodies are discussed and possible future research opportunities are identified. 
Keywords: High-Frequency Trading, HFT, Information Flow, Value Flow. 
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In January 2007, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) introduced a hybrid market enabling inves-
tors to choose between executing market orders via a broker or an automated exchange system. The 
introduction of the automated exchange system decreased average execution time of (large-stock) 
market orders from nine seconds to less than one second per trade (Hendershott & Moulton, 2007). 
Investors have since continued to automate trading processes using computer generated trading deci-
sions, electronic order submissions, and post-trade order management (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott & 
Riordan, 2009). Simultaneously, market platforms have replaced traditional floor trading by electronic 
limit-order books and electronic order matching engines (Jain, 2005; Liu, 2005). Hence, increasing 
execution speeds have enabled various high frequency trading (HFT) strategies such as high frequency 
(HF) market making, pinging, and arbitrage trading (Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010). In 2010, the eco-
nomic and financial impact of HFT was reflected in a 300 million dollar investment into a fibre-optic 
cable, which accelerated order transmissions between the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the 
NASDAQ stock exchange by three milliseconds (Kauffman, 2013).  
The significant risks which accompany these technological advancements became apparent in the fol-
lowing market irregularities. On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped over 1,000 
points in intraday trading during the so called ‘flash crash’ resulting in a public discussion about the 
necessity of increased regulation for HFT (Easley, de Prado, & O'Hara, 2012; Rose, 2011; Wah & 
Wellman, 2013). In August 2012, an automated stock trading algorithm of the Knight Capital Group 
repeatedly bought and sold millions of shares leading to 440 million dollars in losses within less than 
one hour (Adler, 2012). The bestselling book ‘Flash Boys’ has recently contributed to a controversial 
debate about the influence of HFT on the economy and its effect on the wealth of private investors in 
the United States (U.S.) (Lewis, 2014). However, a clear understanding of the interdependent infor-
mation flows in HFT markets and their influence on different stakeholders still represents a gap in re-
cent literature. 
Representing approximately two percent of all operating trading firms in the U.S., HFT firms account 
for 73% of U.S. equity trading volume (Iati, 2009; Rose, 2011). HFT has significant influence on the 
financial markets and its relevance continues to grow (Haldane, 2010; Iati, 2009; Zubulake & Lee, 
2011). This research aims to contribute to the conceptual understanding of HFT by identifying rele-
vant market participants, analysing three widely adopted HFT strategies and providing a conceptual 
framework for information and value flows in HFT financial markets. A more profound understanding 
of HFT may support the introduction of improved financial regulation as well as financial risk man-
agement.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and institutional back-
ground identifying information and value flows in HFT capital markets from existing literature. Chap-
ter 3 describes our qualitative research approach and provides information about the sample, context, 
and data analysis. In chapter 4, we present our findings including the HFT Information Value Frame-
work. Chapter 5 discusses our research results followed by stating the implications, limitations, and 
opportunities for future research. Finally, we draw conclusions in chapter 7. 
2 Theoretical and Institutional Background 
In this chapter, relevant market participants and interrelations between them are identified. Moreover, 
basic concepts such as the HFT trading process and three widely adopted HFT strategies are intro-
duced.  
HFT represents a subcategory of algorithmic trading, which is defined by an electronic automation of 
trading decisions, order submissions, and post-trade order management (Brogaard, 2010; Hendershott, 
Jones, & Menkveld, 2011). HFT can be differentiated from algorithmic trading by shorter holding pe-
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riods of securities and lower latency (Aldridge, 2013; Wah & Wellman, 2013). Latency describes the 
time interval between the submission of a trading decision and the arrival of the order at a market 
place. For example, one HF trader in a study by Menkveld (2013) uses an upper-bound latency of 1.67 
milliseconds which emphasizes the importance of speed to HF traders.  
2.1 Market Participants 
HF traders: There are several important differences between regular traders and high frequency (HF) 
traders. HF traders submit and cancel massive quantities of orders, execute high trading volumes, 
trade in and out of positions very quickly, and aim to close each trading day without significant open 
positions (Brogaard, 2010; Cvitanic & Kirilenko, 2010; Gomber & Haferkorn, 2013). Further, HF 
traders only engage in proprietary trading (Menkveld, 2013). There are three groups of HF traders: 
Traditional broker-dealers who trade on HFT strategies in addition to their client business, hedge 
funds, and proprietary trading firms who generate the majority of HFT trading volume (Ye, 2010; 
Zubulake & Lee, 2011). 
Market platforms include exchanges, over-the-counter (OTC) markets, electronic communication 
networks (ECNs) and dark pools. Among the main responsibilities of market platforms are order 
matching and maintaining the limit-order book. ECNs, also referred to as light pools, have introduced 
electronic limit-order books and have automated order matching using algorithms (McAndrews & 
Stefanadis, 2000; Smith, 2010). In the past years, the majority of trading volume including derivative 
assets has moved from traditional exchange trading floors to ECNs (Ortega 2007; Markham 2008). 
Private trading networks, also referred to as dark pools, are not required to disclose public quotes. Rel-
evant information such as order size and traders’ identity is not published until a trade is completely 
executed (Kratz & Schöneborn, 2013; Smith, 2010). Market platforms generate revenues through 
transaction fees, typically charging liquidity removers while providing liquidity providers a small 
credit (Foucault, Kadan, & Kandel, 2013). In addition, many market platforms provide services such 
as proximity services and data-feed services to generate further revenues. Proximity services include 
co-location, which describes the installation of a trader’s hardware in close proximity to the data cen-
tre of the market platform leading to a 100-200 millisecond latency reduction (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 
2009). Revenues from additional services such as market data fees represent an increasingly important 
source of revenue. In 2006, market data fees accounted for 50% of the NYSE Group‘s total revenue 
and approximately 80% of NASDAQ’s total revenue (Markham & Harty, 2007). 
Clearing members: Trading on the order book of market platforms is restricted to registered clearing 
members such as brokers (Clark, 2010). Due to the high fragmentation of financial markets, brokers 
play an important role in providing access to a variety of market platforms (Stoll, 2001). Even sophis-
ticated HF traders often require a broker to submit their orders. The traditional way of submitting or-
ders through a broker to the order book is not suitable for HF traders due to the high level of latency. 
HF traders use direct market access. Direct market access permits HF traders to access execution plat-
forms directly, without intervention from a broker’s trading desk (Udatha, 2011). Three different types 
of direct market access are identified in recent literature. First, automated order routing permits trad-
ers to transmit orders electronically to a market platform using a broker’s IT infrastructure and market-
member ID. Traders obtain real-time market data such as order book information from the broker ena-
bling the implementation of computer-based trading strategies. Intermediary brokers are financially 
responsible for orders, which are submitted using their infrastructure.  Therefore, they reserve the right 
to monitor and stop orders before execution. Moreover, brokers oblige traders to meet strict capital 
requirements and to contribute to a loss-sharing pool (Clark, 2010; Udatha, 2011). Second, sponsored 
access allows the customers of a broker to access the market platform’s matching engine directly 
without using the broker’s IT infrastructure. Hence, the intermediary broker is not able to apply con-
trol mechanisms such as monitoring and cancelling of orders (Udatha, 2011). The SEC has banned 
sponsored access in the U.S. and requires brokers to set up risk management controls (Callcott & 
Foley, 2011). Third, direct access by non-intermediary market-members describes unregistered and 
non-intermediary traders such as hedge funds, proprietary trading firms and other HF traders. All of 
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them connect directly to the market platform's matching system using their own infrastructure and 
member ID. However, these non-registered members still require a clearing arrangement with a clear-
ing member intermediary broker (Udatha, 2011). 
Information service providers include market platforms providing data-feed services and external in-
formation service providers offering consolidated feeds. Furthermore, customized and machine-
readable economic data and corporate news are made available to support electronic trading systems.  
Technology providers support HF traders with various services to ensure low latency. For instance, 
communication-service providers offer low latency network connectivity services in metropolitan re-
gions as well as long-haul routes. Furthermore, software developers distribute solutions for automated 
trading decision-making, smart order routing, and general trading tools as well as direct interfaces to 
information service providers, brokers, and market platforms. HFT firms further integrate proprietary 
trading software with external trading software using software development environments. In addition, 
hardware providers offer state-of-the-art computer hardware systems which further contribute to high 
execution speeds (Markham & Harty, 2007). 
Clearing agencies are responsible for the clearing and settlement of trades and include clearing corpo-
rations and depositories. Clearing corporations perform the confirmation, settlement and delivery of 
transactions while depositories maintain ownership records, hold securities, certificates, and transfer 
positions between participants (Reference). 
2.2 Trading Process 
This chapter provides details about HFT processes, which consist of four phases: Information phase, 
order routing phase, order matching phase, and clearing phase. Since the clearing phase of HF trades is 
identical to regular trades, we will focus on the information phase, order routing phase, and order 
matching phase. 
In the information phase, HF traders initially determine a strategy and set up the necessary IT infra-
structure, and software systems in collaboration with technology providers. Proprietary trading firms, 
which represent the majority of HF traders, typically lack the resources to set up two systems; there-
fore focusing on one strategy (Brogaard, 2010; Ye, 2010). As a next step, HF traders use smart order 
routing systems to select automatically the optimal order type, market platform, and broker for order 
execution while taking real-time market conditions and historical reference data into account. This 
allows the calculation of transaction costs, the detection, and prediction of liquidity (StreamBase, 
2014). The execution parameters are highly relevant regarding the execution speed and execution costs 
of an order. Thereby, smart order routing systems aggregate the necessary input data for the decision 
from the information service providers. Next, the underlying algorithms determine trading quantity 
and volume. This allows traders to split orders into smaller parts in order to avoid losses due to dis-
torting effects on the market (Paskelian, 2010). For this process traders often use the volume-weighted 
average price or time-weighted average price algorithms, which are often accompanied by proprietary 
algorithms (Bansal, Mishra, & Pachouri, 2010). Finally, smart order routing systems are used to sub-
mit orders to market platforms electronically using standardized interfaces (FIXProtocol, 2014).  
In the order routing phase, the smart order routing system submits the order according to the routing 
decision, which was computed in the information phase. As the routing decision is highly relevant to 
the execution speed as well as execution costs of the trade (Paskelian, 2010), execution parameters 
comprise the selection of an execution venue. An order can be routed to an exchange, OTC market, 
ECN, or dark pool. The HF trader may have access to the market platform through direct membership, 
but most likely an intermediary broker provides access to the market platform. Using direct market 
access models, HF traders can route each trade to a different market platform using different market 
access models (see also chapter 2.1). Furthermore, execution parameters include the order type. Mar-
ket orders can be used to buy or sell securities immediately at the best available price (SEC, 2014b). 
Limit orders are used to buy securities below a pre-specified price or to sell securities above a pre-
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specified price. Limit orders which have not yet been executed are maintained by the market platforms 
in the limit-order book until they are executed or cancelled (SEC, 2014a). Furthermore, limit orders 
may include validity constraints such as “good-for-day”, “good-until-cancelled”, or “immediate-or-
cancel” (Harris & Hasbrouck, 1996).  
During the order matching phase, buy and sell orders are matched electronically in the market plat-
form’s matching engine. Opening and closing prices of financial assets are often determined by auc-
tions, while price during continuous trading are determine using priority rules (Eurex, 2014). Priority 
rules define the sequence of order matching if there are multiple possibilities to match orders. The 
most common priority rule is price-time priority. In this case, the order with the best price is executed 
first. If multiple orders in the book have the same price, the first submitted order, is executed first 
(Stoll, 2001). Under the price-time priority rule, large orders can prevent smaller orders from being 
executed if intraday price volatility is low (Eurex, 2014). HF traders have no direct influence on the 
order matching phase. However, since order matching mechanisms differ between market platforms, 
knowledge about the matching algorithms is highly relevant for order routing decisions in order to im-
plement HFT strategies.  
2.3 HFT Strategies 
Section 2.3 provides the theoretical background on the three most relevant trading strategies in HFT: 
Market making, arbitrage trading and pinging. Market making represents the most common strategy in 
HFT and improves market quality by providing liquidity (Easley et al., 2012; Hagströmer & Nordén, 
2013; Menkveld, 2013; Zubulake & Lee, 2011). Traders acting as market makers provide liquidity to 
position takers by placing passive orders, and profit from the spread between bid and ask prices. On 
electronic exchanges, every trader can submit limit orders in the system; thereby effectively acting as a 
market maker (Avellaneda & Stoikov, 2008). However, market makers are exposed to position risks, 
also referred to as inventory risk. Inventory risks emerge from the volatility of asset prices. Therefore, 
market makers balance personal risk considerations with the market environment. More specifically, 
the market maker derives bid and ask quotes by a two-step procedure. First, a personal indifference 
valuation for the stock is done considering the market maker’s current inventory. Second, the trader 
calibrates his bid and ask quotes to the limit-order book using the probability of the execution of his 
quotes (Avellaneda & Stoikov, 2008). In addition, market makers are also exposed to order-flow tox-
icity. In this case, market makers may be unaware that they are providing liquidity at a loss, while in-
formed traders may have knowledge about the future price of an asset due to asymmetric information. 
However, order-flow toxicity in high frequency markets can be measured and volatility can be reduced 
using a volume synchronized probability of informed trading toxicity metric (Easley et al., 2012).  
Arbitrage strategies exploit disparities in the price at which an equivalent financial instrument is trad-
ed; either in different markets (statistical arbitrage), or at different times (latency arbitrage) (Wah & 
Wellman, 2013). Statistical Arbitrage strategies profit from small price differences between two mar-
ket platforms. Arbitrageurs take advantage of the different conditions by buying and selling the same 
security on both market platforms at the same time profiting from the spread between the two prices. 
Although the opportunities to gain profits with this strategy have decreased significantly due to in-
creased competition, there are still revenues generated (Zubulake & Lee, 2011). HF traders use algo-
rithms to implement statistical arbitrage strategies as arbitrage opportunities exist merely for fractions 
of a second. Traders that use arbitrage models are mainly takers of liquidity (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012). 
To increase efficiency, HFT firms use so called neural networks which are able to simulate thousands 
of scenarios in order to detect arbitrage opportunities (McGowan, 2010). Statistical arbitrage opportu-
nities can also arise between individual stocks and their underlying index. These opportunities are also 
very short lived. The competition for such trades is an essential component of how HF traders contrib-
ute to market efficiency (Zubulake & Lee, 2011). Latency Arbitrage is based on differences in execu-
tion speeds. HF traders can achieve profits through an advantage in access and response times (Wah & 
Wellman, 2013). HF traders try to forecast market movements using real-time newsfeed data, and re-
act faster than competitors using fast execution speeds. Latency arbitrage in fragmented financial mar-
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kets reduces total surplus leading to improved allocative efficiency but negatively impacts liquidity 
(Cohen & Szpruch, 2012; Wah & Wellman, 2013). 
Pinging strategies describe automated passive orders, which are cancelled almost immediately, if no 
response from the market is available. If an order is executed, the trader gains information that he can 
use to his advantage (McGowan, 2010). In other words, pinging represents the use of “immediate-or-
cancel” orders to look for liquidity in markets lacking transparency such as dark pools. The trading 
centre that receives an “immediate-or-cancel” order will execute the order immediately if it has avail-
able liquidity and the order can be matched with an order in the limit-order book. Otherwise, the trad-
ing centre will immediately respond to the order with a cancelation. Therefore, pinging is highly valu-
able for HF traders to gather information about the orders of other investors in dark pools (Rose, 
2010). As pinging is valuable for HF traders, some dark pools have implemented ways to identify 
pinging and charge traders for their pinging activities (Aldridge, 2013; Kratz & Schöneborn, 2013).   
3 Research Method 
This research examines interactions between stakeholders in HFT markets. While existing research 
often focuses on individual aspects of HFT (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2009; Easley et al., 2012; Iati, 2009), 
our research aims to link prior research and to provide a comprehensive conceptual model of HFT 
markets. We used a qualitative research approach being suited to address “how” questions and derive 
in-depth insights (Pratt, 2009; Yin, 2014).  
3.1 Data  
We conducted semi-structured expert interviews to identify and analyse information and value flows 
among relevant HFT market participants. We further used the expert interviews to ensure the rele-
vance of our research results, and to gain further understanding of the organizational, technological, 
and conceptual challenges in HFT markets.  
Experts are defined by their degree of activity in the field that is relevant to the research (Meuser & 
Nagel, 1991). We conducted expert interviews with five HFT experts (n = 5) from different stakehold-
er groups and with different professional backgrounds. The participating HFT experts were chosen 
based on their industry experience, personal background, and unique position in the market partici-
pant’s structure. We interviewed a traditional trader working at a private bank focusing primarily on 
fixed income trading. Further, we interviewed a traditional trader from a retail bank participating pri-
marily in exchange traded funds trading. In addition, we conducted interviews with a manager of a 
trading office, a managing board director from a stock exchange, and a regulator at the stock exchange 
in Frankfurt. Table 1 provides an overview of all interviewed experts. All interviews were face-to-face 
meetings and lasted between 30 minutes to 1.5 hours. With one exception, all participants agreed to a 
recording of the interview.  
 
Expert Market participant Position 
Alpha Trading office (Private bank) Head of Private Banking Family Trading Office 
Beta Trader (Private bank) Trader Fixed Incomes  
Gamma Stock exchange (regional)  Managing board 
Delta Trader (Bank) ETF Sales trading 
Epsilon Stock exchange (national) Head of Unit Political Analysis; Market Policy & Eu-
ropean Public Affairs 
Table 1. Overview of the interviewed experts 
Interview questions were derived from literature according to the guidelines from Myers and Newman 
(2007). The suitability of the expert interview questions was checked by two independent researchers. 
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Questions implying a certain answer and questions solely targeting contextual knowledge were adjust-
ed. Due to the multifaceted backgrounds and positions of the interviewed experts, the questions were 
further differentiated. All interviewed experts were asked general questions regarding information on 
the financial markets, and the trading process. Furthermore, each interview partner was asked specific 
questions regarding their knowledge, their attitude towards HFT, and HFT strategies. All questions 
were posed as open questions giving the experts an opportunity to emphasize different aspects which 
they regarded as being the most important.  
3.2 Data Analysis 
In the course of conducting the expert interviews, we simultaneously collected and analysed the 
gained data. The analysis of the interviews required the transcription of the recorded interviews. We 
applied literal transcription following the principle that a transcription system should be easy to write, 
easy to read, easy to learn and easy to search (Buber & Holzmüller, 2007; Flick, 2006). The expert 
interviews were translated and the dialect of some experts as well as grammar mistakes were corrected 
as it is recommended (Mayring, 2006). The data analysis primarily requires coding of the text data-
base, label variables (categories, concepts and propositions), and their interrelationships in an iterative 
three step process. Open coding represented the first step. It captures the naming, categorizing and 
description of phenomena found in the transcript. Second, concepts were derived from the first-order 
codes, which are the basic units of analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Axial coding represented the 
third step. It describes the process of relating codes to each other and generating categories. Categories 
are higher in level and more abstract than the concepts they represent (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The 
coding of the data revealed twelve categories. Basic concepts of HFT, Market Participants, Market 
Access, Services of market platforms, Information Providers, Type of Information, Value of Infor-
mation, Algorithms and Strategies, Legal, Fairness, Regulatory, Future Outlook. Table 1 presents an 
excerpt of our coding scheme showing two categories (Market Participants and Services of Market 
Platforms) including the amount of occurrences during the coding process.  
 
Categories Quantity Concepts (separated by “;”) First-Order-Codes 
Market  
Participants 
20 • HF traders; Multiple exchang-
es, market platforms with high 
amount of liquidity 
• Grey areas, ancillary markets 
• Information providers 
• Networks 
• Market access providers, order 
routers (brokers) 
• Partners to trade with 
• Providers of predesigned algo-
rithms 
• In the end it is all about getting 
the information. Basically 
Bloomberg, Reuters and other 
News providers are the most 
important co-players of the HF 
traders. 
• Trading platforms like ATS 
were especially designed for 
HF traders with lower costs for 
HFT that enable a higher 
amount of trades. 
• […] 
Services of Market 
Platforms 
7 • Proximity services and co-
location 
• Research information 
• Matching 
• Clearing and settlement 
• Technological services (fast 
connection to the infrastructure 
and data products that enable 
customers to process infor-
mation efficiently) 
• Execution quality and the sup-
• Proximity services and co-
location were started to make 
the market place more interest-
ing for HF traders. 
• Our approach is to offer our 
clients an all-round package. 
That starts with providing in-
formation, (…) matching, (…) 
clearing and settlement. We of-
fer the total value chain. One 
part that rose in importance 
over the last couple of years is 
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port of decision-making technological services. (…) 
fast connection to the infra-
structure (…) data products 
that enable customers to pro-
cess information efficiently. 
• […] 
Table 2. Axial Coding of Qualitative Data (Excerpt) 
The fourth step is selective coding. Selective coding describes the process of choosing a core category, 
and relating all other categories to that category; therefore building (generalized) relationships be-
tween a category, its concepts, and between discrete categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The rela-
tionships between the derived categories are described in the results and later on discussed. The corre-
lations between the categories serve as the basis for the analysis of information and value flows within 
HFT capital markets. The following categories have been identified and are described in the results 
section: Market Participants, Market Access, Information Providers, Services of Market Platforms and 
Algorithms and Strategies.  
4 Results 
In this chapter, we develop the HFT Information Value Framework drawing from the theoretical 
background section in which we identified relevant interrelations between market participants. Fur-
thermore, we use interview statements from the expert interviews to analyse information and value 
flows. We relate the theoretical background and the results from our expert interviews to develop the 
framework. Thereby, we are able to provide a conceptual understanding of how market participants 
exchange information and value in HF capital markets. To describe the HFT Information Value 
Framework, we use the e3-value method. This method is designed to visualize how economic value is 
created and exchanged within a network of actors (Gordijn & Akkermans, 2001). The e3-value meth-
od is suitable to define, derive, and analyse multi-enterprise relationships, e-business scenarios, and 
operations requirements in both qualitative and quantitative ways. The method focuses on value rather 
than on processes. This is a main difference between the e3-value method and traditional representa-
tions such as UML (Gordijn & Akkermans, 2001). 
We focus our analysis on the interrelations between HF Traders and their most relevant business part-
ners including Brokers, Market Platforms, Information Providers, and third-party Technology Provid-
ers. The value flows between these stakeholders include information flows, monetary flows, and tech-
nology exchange. Regulatory Bodies and Clearing Agencies were not part of our analysis since they 
do not directly exchange information or value with HF Traders during the trading process.  
Based on the analysed data, we were able to visualize interrelations between market participants in 
HFT markets. Figure 1 visualizes the results and represents the HFT Value Information Framework. 
Since HF traders and Market Platforms are the most relevant market participants, the framework is 
described from their perspective.  
HF Trader perspective: HF Traders pay fees (monetary flow) to Market Platforms in exchange for 
real-time market information (information flow). Moreover, HF Traders obtain market data, historical 
data as well as unstructured news (information flow) from external Information Providers in exchange 
for a payment (monetary flow). Further, HF traders receive hardware, software and other technology 
from third-party Technology Providers (technology exchange) while Technology Providers receive 
monetary flows from HF Traders. Finally, HF Traders interrelate with Brokers and Market Platforms 
to gain market access for a nominal fee (monetary flow). 
The following statements from expert interviews are used to validate the identified interrelations be-
tween HF Traders and other market participants. According to experts Alpha and Beta, the main ob-
jectives of HF Traders are fast decision-making and efficient order submission. Therefore, HF Traders 
interrelate with Market Platforms as well as Information Providers such as Bloomberg and Reuters, 
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which offer real-time market data and historic data to ensure fast decision making. In addition, HF 
Traders pay premium fees (monetary flow) for “special customer services” and receive information 
before regular traders (information flow). “The more you pay, the earlier you receive information” 
(Expert Alpha). To leverage the available information, HF Traders interrelate with third party Tech-
nology Providers such as Morgan Stanley which offer trading software and algorithms. “There are 
algorithms that only place orders, […] log orders, […] and algorithms that analyse the market” (Ex-
pert Beta). “Algorithms can be clustered into non-intelligent and intelligent algorithms” (Expert Be-
ta). The availability of real-time information and trading algorithms enables HF Traders to realize fast 
decision making. An efficient order submission is obtained by direct market access, either using the 
Broker’s IT infrastructure to access a Market Platform or using direct market access via membership 
for Market Platforms that are regularly used. These services require the payment of fees (monetary 
flow). Traditional Brokers are used for “more exotic securities” and provide access to less frequently 
used market platforms (Expert Alpha). HF traders interrelate with Market Platforms to make use of 
proximity services such as co-location to decrease latency (technology exchange). 
Market Platform perspective: The primary obligation of Market Platforms is the electronic matching 
of orders from different registered clearing members that are obliged to pay a membership fee (mone-
tary flow). In addition, Market Platforms provide data feed services and supply real-time market data 
to HF Traders and Information Providers (information flow). While some data feed services are free, 
Market Platforms receive monetary flows for special services such as real-time market data. Market 
Platforms have further introduced proximity services such as co-location (technology exchange) to 
minimize latency times, and to increase their appeal to HF traders. For these additional technological 
services, Market Platforms charge high fees (monetary flow). “Technological services have increased 
in importance in recent years […] The data [feed] services […] are more and more important […] for 
[market platforms’] revenues, so the portfolio has changed massively in the last five to ten years” 
(Expert Epsilon). Finally, Market Platforms and Clearing Agencies interrelate in the process of clear-
ing and settlement. 
The HFT Value Information Framework provides the basis for the discussion regarding the perception 
of HFT and the necessity for regulation in the subsequent chapter. 
 
 
Figure 1:  HFT Value Information Framework 
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In this section, we discuss our results combining our insights from practice and theory. Thereby, we 
use our visualization of the information flows to discuss interrelations in HFT markets. Our data and 
the visualization allow us to discuss different HFT strategies as the visualization contributes to a better 
understanding of the influence and the interdependencies between algorithms, stakeholders, and ma-
chine-to-machine communication. Finally, we discuss the necessity of increased regulation in German 
and U.S. HFT capital markets. 
5.1 Perception of HFT strategies 
In the course of our research, we identified a total of seventeen trading strategies that are used by HF 
traders. Most of these strategies are not new to the market and were used long before the emergence of 
HFT. HFT does not represent a strategy but a technological evolution that allows traders to adopt and 
align existing strategies and to make them more profitable. The discussion on HFT in the public press 
and in academic literature mainly focuses on the impact of HFT on market fairness and market quality 
(Lewis 2014). While these aspects are not the main focus of this research, we found that the most 
widely adopted HFT strategies are market making and arbitrage trading (Easley et al., 2012; 
Hagströmer & Nordén, 2013; Zubulake & Lee, 2011). Both of these strategies are perceived as benefi-
cial to the market quality, particularly considering the high level of market fragmentation (Expert 
Gamma).  
Traditional traders among the interviewed experts expressed negative perceptions regarding HFT. For 
instance, the informational advantages that enable HF traders to make faster trading decisions than 
regular traders are perceived as being “unfair” and lacking transparency (Expert Alpha). “You look at 
the screen and suddenly there’s a lot going on. Somebody is pushing the market without the rest of the 
market having the information available. All you can do is watch” (Expert Alpha). “We experienced 
high-frequency trading in relation [to stock trading], unfortunately rather negatively, in that we our-
selves were exploited by an algo[rithm]” (Expert Beta). According to Expert Alpha, transparency and 
fairness in stock exchanges have to be ensured, otherwise trading volume will shift to other trading 
platforms such as dark pools. “If the development continues like this […], more volume will move from 
relatively transparent markets […] to private trading venues” (Expert Alpha). These statements corre-
late with similar criticism in recent literature. Lewis (2014) describes different scenarios in which HF 
traders gain advantages over traditional traders.  
On the other hand, expert Gamma expressed the view that the majority of algorithms have positive 
effects. For example, algorithms “decrease the market impact of big institutional orders by splitting 
orders leading to a better price for the customer and more price stability in the market” (Expert 
Gamma). Furthermore, passive market making strategies have a positive effect on the market due to 
increasing liquidity (Expert Gamma). However, there are also algorithms with negative effects. 
“There are opportunistic algorithms […]” (Expert Gamma). “The market maker has to use technolo-
gy in order to react to market situations” (Expert Epsilon). According to Expert Epsilon, the introduc-
tion of harmonized regulation across the European Union in 2007, has increased the fragmentation of 
stock markets in Germany. As a result, Expert Alpha emphasizes the need for traders to reach out to a 
variety of market platforms to trade stocks including ECNs such as Xetra, Eurex, M-DAX and S-
DAX. Therefore, Expert Epsilon suggested that HFT is a natural reaction to arbitrage opportunities 
that arise from increased market fragmentation. “The reason why HFT has boomed in stock markets is 
of course the fragmentation in the stock market and therefore the opportunity for arbitrage revenues” 
(Expert Epsilon). Due to arbitrage trading and market making, HFT strategies have a positive effect on 
markets. “The strategies exist for a long time, and they are very positive. Also, speculation is good for 
markets” (Expert Epsilon). “Since 2007, we have a fragmented landscape and without HFT, there are 
big price differences between the markets” (Expert Epsilon). Expert Epsilon further suggests that pric-
es in HFT capital markets are fair. “For the normal investor, it usually is not about the third decimal 
in the price and therefore it is still a fair price that takes place” (Expert Epsilon). 
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The different experiences and perceptions of our experts reflect the controversial discussion about 
HFT in current literature. On the one hand, there are very negative perceptions about HF traders re-
garding unfair advantages. However, experts also acknowledge that HFT fulfils an important function 
of arbitrage trading in highly fragmented capital markets. It was also suggested that traders have an 
obligation to invest in technology in order to compete in HFT markets. “Many market participants are 
very critical […] about HFT. If you want to play in this market, of course you have to invest [in tech-
nology] to be able to compete” (Expert Epsilon). The necessity to use technology in order to compete 
in HFT markets might present a problem to smaller investors who do not have the resources to buy 
appropriate technology.  
5.2 Regulation in HF capital markets 
Regulation is a highly relevant topic highlighted by the recent introduction of the “Hochfrequenzhan-
delsgesetz” in Germany in May, 2013 (Gomber & Nassauer, 2014). This law aims to make HF trades 
more transparent. Algorithmic orders are “flagged” and can therefore be easily identified and ana-
lysed. The data about flagged algorithmic orders can be used by researchers to further investigate the 
topics of market fairness and market quality. 
The opinions of the interviewed experts on the necessity for increased regulation of HFT are closely 
correlated to their views on the impact of HFT on market fairness. The experts that considered HFT as 
unfair urged for stricter regulation. Traditional traders identified a high urgency for increased regula-
tion in order to improve market transparency and ensure fair prices for every market participant (Ex-
pert Alpha). “There are social disadvantages if many market participants are settled with not entirely 
fair prices; or if some yield an advantage”. (Expert Alpha). They suggested that the positive and nega-
tive effects of HFT on capital markets should be researched in more detail. “It would also be interest-
ing to find out, whether HFT really harms the market as it is always stated” (Expert Beta).  
On the other hand, Expert Gamma being a market platform representative suggested a step-by-step 
approach towards regulation to ensure the goal of optimal resource allocation through capital markets. 
He emphasized the necessity to further investigate HFT before introducing new regulation. “First, 
regulation needs to comprehend HFT. To do that, there are the flagging of algo-orders and the exces-
sive usage fees now. One should first look at these results now and regulate less” (Expert Gamma).  
One serious problem in capital markets is market manipulation. However, this is perceived as an inde-
pendent problem from the technological advancements of HFT. “Market manipulation […] is of 
course negative but that has nothing to do with the technology. These things are simply harming be-
haviour in general […] that has to be prohibited” (Expert Epsilon). Due to the positive effects of arbi-
trage trading and market making strategies on market quality, regulation should not completely dis-
miss HF traders. “If we prohibit [HFT] right now, e.g. through a transaction tax […], the spreads 
would go apart and there would be greater peaks in certain market phases” (Expert Epsilon). In that 
sense, we consider the analysis of information and value flows between market participants as valua-
ble starting point for the investigation of future regulation. 
Several experts expressed strong scepticism about the ability of regulatory bodies to implement the 
appropriate regulation. Expert Alpha pointed out that the best university graduates prefer joining trad-
ing firms over regulatory institutions. “The regulatory bodies lack the competency to regulate in a 
differentiated manner” (Expert Gamma). Nevertheless, experts agree that in the future, there will be 
more regulation in HFT markets. “There will be very strong regulation in the future.” (Expert Delta). 
There are also significant differences in regulation between Europe and the United States. “Germany 
has a front role in regulation since the introduction of the Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz on May 15, 
2013” (Expert Epsilon). “The U.S. have to implement what we already have in Europe […] There are 
security measures that have to be maintained by market venues. How can you let 70% of the trading 
volume be done only by HF traders or algo[rithmic] traders without security measures?” (Expert Ep-
silon).  
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While there is a discrepancy between the experts for the need to regulate HFT, it can be assumed that 
solely local regulations will not change HFT behaviour. Nonetheless, the HFT Value Information 
Framework provides a first attempt to make processes and value creation transparent within the HFT 
value network. In consequence, firms can use our visualization to improve their own business process-
es and adapt or modify their business model. On the other hand, it can be used by institutions to ad-
dress certain aspects affecting the macro environment. 
6 Implications, Limitations and Further Research 
We base our research on theory and enrich our results by conducting expert interviews. Based on our 
data, we develop and evaluate the HFT Information Value Framework. In consequence, the main con-
tribution of our research can be seen in linking theoretical pieces of a puzzles into a generic frame-
work. While we analyse (value) relations, further research should enrich our framework with specific 
technical details. 
The topic of HFT is a very current topic in IS research that offers many opportunities for future re-
search such as qualitative and quantitative research on a more technical level. The negative perception 
of HFT among regular traders indicates that further research needs to investigate the fairness of HFT 
markets. Similar to prior studies that have been conducted in the field of HFT, we experienced limita-
tions in finding HFT experts. Including experts with a professional background in HFT such as em-
ployees of proprietary trading firms would provide a more balanced perspective on the issue. This pre-
sents a research opportunity for future research to conduct a study from an insider perspective on HF 
traders. Further, as stated by Expert Beta, HFT strategies, their amount of usage, and their impact on 
financial markets should be further analysed in order to gain a more concrete evaluation. Here our 
HFT Information Value Framework can be taken as base. This would allow regulators to develop and 
implement appropriate regulations such as the “Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz”, which incorporates first 
regulatory steps. From a researchers perspective, studies on HFT from different perspectives such as 
IS, economics, and business administration would improve our comprehensive understanding of HFT. 
Based on our results, we contribute to a conceptual understanding of HFT covering information and 
value flows between algorithms, stakeholders, and machine-to-machine communication. Thereby, we 
visualize interdependencies, the importance of information flows, and their influence. In consequence, 
our results can be useful in different fields and for different stakeholders including practitioners, re-
searchers, and regulatory bodies. From an IS perspective, interfaces between the information technol-
ogy of different market participants are visualized allowing an optimisation and analysis of processes, 
used technology, and organizational aspects relating to IT-Governance. 
7 Conclusion 
The relevance of HFT in today’s capital markets is considerable having increased rapidly over the last 
few years. Research in this field is available but primarily focuses on the influence of HFT on market 
quality. Our research contributes to a generic understanding of information and value flows between 
HFT stakeholders by developing a HFT Information Value Framework. In consequence, this research 
offers a more precise understanding of value flows in HFT capital markets. Furthermore, this research 
provides insights about the three most commonly used HFT strategies: Market making, arbitrage trad-
ing and pinging. In addition, this research creates a basis for further qualitative and quantitative studies 
covering different aspects of HFT capital markets in greater detail. 
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